towards the Federal Reserve as the regulator of choice. It looked like a game 3 of musical chairs in which the SEC was slow to find its place.
While the agency achieved greater stability after President Obama's appointment of Mary Shapiro as Chair of the Commission, the turbulence in 2008 focused new attention on justifications for the agency's existence and where the agency has a relative advantage as a regulator. This article speaks to those questions, suggesting four core principles that should guide thinking about the agency's future in the aftermath of the financial meltdown. The first principle is what the SEC should not do: It should not be a prudential regulator, with a focus on systemic risk. Second, there remains a clear need for the role that the SEC has performed for 75 years as the principal government regulator of securities markets, the public companies whose securities are traded on those markets, and the various financial intermediaries who act in those markets. Third, the SEC should focus on its core characteristics as an independent agency that define its relative advantage as a regulator-its impartiality in performing a quasi-judicial role; its independence from the executive and legislative branches that enable it to avoid decision-making dominated by short-term interests; its expertise to regulate sophisticated transactions and a complex subject matter; and its ability to harness the knowledge and experience of the private sector. Fourth, the recent financial crisis has highlighted the role of the SEC as the vehicle for the government's control over the finance sector of the economy, a role which the SEC performed to a greater degree at its origin, but which has been less visible in recent decades. The essay discusses each of those principles in turn. 5 . But see Erik R. Sirri, Remarks at the National Economists Club: Securities Markets and Regulatory Reform (Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://www/sec/gov/news/speech/2009/spch040909ers.htm (explaining the CSE "effectively added an additional layer of supervision at the holding company where none had existed previously." SEC action in 2004 regarding broker-dealer net capital rules "has been unfairly characterized as being a major contributor to the current crisis" but the net capital rules alone could not limit the ability of the investment banks to undertake activities with the highest levels of inherent risk "outside of the US broker-dealer subsidiary.").
6 . See, e.g., IN FED WE TRUST, supra note 2, at 24 (quoting an interview with former Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson and later emphasis of Fed chairman Ben Bernanke's testimony and concluding "[t]he law didn't provide a clean way for the government to take over or close an investment bank-no matter how important").
I. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
Much of the public debate in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis focused on the failures of prudential regulation. With the innovation in financial products such as securitization and the use of hedging strategies, various financial participants found themselves exposed to serious losses as the economy slowed. High leverage and insufficient capital exacerbated the risk of financial failure of individual firms facing such losses. This, in turn, exposed other firms to instability as the failing firms could not deliver on positions taken in swaps and other transactions. As this level of exposure increased, firms became more reluctant to enter into transactions with some or many counterparties and extensions of credit froze across a broad spectrum of the economy.
The SEC has not traditionally focused on prudential regulation, leaving that role to banking regulators such as the Federal Reserve Board and various other regulators. The SEC did not do particularly well with the Consolidated 4 Supervised Entity Program, and it seems to lack a relative advantage in performing that role.
5
The recent financial crisis exposed a pattern of companies exploiting the existence of multiple prudential regulators to avoid tighter government oversight and creating greater risk to the economy because such arbitrage can leave firms, their customers, and counterparties more vulnerable to financial failure. Questions of liquidity, leverage, and credit lock-up are best centralized in one regulator across the economy, or perhaps in a council of regulators. The recent experience has also revealed the need for such a regulator to have sufficient winding-up authority for firms that have failed. 8 . Id. 9. As discussed in more detail in Part IV, on matters of internal corporate governance of public companies, the SEC is not the principal government regulator. State corporations law, and particularly the important corporate law jurisdiction of Delaware, creates corporations, define the key roles of shareholders, directors and officer, and provide the rules for corporate transactions such as electing directors and approving mergers. The more difficult question is whether the agency that performs this regulation can be easily separated from the regulation of other functions within the same entity. Regulators in other countries have moved to a consolidated financial regulator, with mixed results. Proposals for financial 7 reform range over a spectrum that includes a twin peaks system or perhaps a triple peaked system, all considerably different from the hodgepodge of regulation in the current American system. The next two parts of this essay 8 argue that regulation of securities markets benefits from a focused securities regulator and that a securities regulator distinct from the prudential regulator has advantages in performing this job.
II. THE SEC'S DISTINCTIVE CORE AS THE PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENTAL REGULATOR OF SECURITIES MARKETS, PUBLIC COMPANIES, AND INTERMEDIARIES
The regulatory function that the SEC has overseen for 75 years has covered three principal areas of regulation: accountants, lawyers, mutual funds, and others). 15 16 17 In regulating these markets, issuing companies, and intermediaries, the SEC performs several core functions. First, it provides a constitution-like structure for the markets, providing rules that private parties might themselves provide in the absence of government, while also shaping those rules in a way that the private parties might not. Second, the securities statutes and the SEC 18 regulations pursuant to them require a broad range of mandatory disclosures beyond what parties themselves, or stock exchanges on which company shares are listed, typically provide. These disclosures permit investors to make 19 more-informed decisions in purchasing or selling stock. In addition, they assist directors in performing their monitoring role under corporate law, permit other gatekeepers to more effectively perform a monitoring role, and generally increase the efficiency of the market in using information. Third, one of the most important functions provided by the SEC is enforcement: its officials police a broad range of behavior affecting investors from insider trading to inaccurate disclosure by companies to breaches of fiduciary duty by intermediaries.
Structuring social control over finance was a task that was central for the Roosevelt administration in its approach to legislation enacted in response to the Great Depression. Some of the more far-reaching controls of the SEC, 
III. THE SEC'S RELATIVE ADVANTAGE AS AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT AGENCY
The SEC's regulatory role, both historically, and what we should expect going forward, reflects the distinct benefits that come from being an independent government agency. Independence, in this sense, means the 22 freedom of action that derives from the fact that the President cannot remove its members and thereby directly affect policy. The President nominates and 23 the Senate confirms the five members of the agency, and the President can name the chair from among the five members. The structure is intentionally 24 designed to provide space for the agency to act independently of the chief executive. In contrast, for example, the Secretary of the Treasury, who serves at the pleasure of the President, is subject to immediate removal. 25 Other characteristics of the agency add to its independence. It is not governed by a single administrator but rather by multi-headed group of five commissioners. No more than three of the five can be members of the same political party, and the commissioners serve staggered five-year terms, providing a regular infusion of new ideas. In contrast to the cabinet 28. See ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 4654-66 (1941) ("Some members of Congress, and the business interests supporting them, feared that the short-term incentives of Presidents would be to use monetary and banking policies for political or electoral benefit to the detriment of long-term economic stability and investment.").
29. The FOMC is a 12-person committee that includes the seven Federal Reserve governors and five presidents of the regional Federal Reserve banks. 12 U.S.C. § 263. These presidents in turn are chosen by the regional bank boards, made up of directors in three classes, two (bank and public members respectively) chosen by member banks and one chosen by the governors of the Federal Reserve Board. 12 U.S.C. § § 304, 305. The FOMC decides questions such as the rate at which the Fed will lend to member banks. The Federal departments where top leadership almost always changes with a change in administration, independent agencies such as the SEC provide a stronger dose of continuity.
The independent characteristics are not historical artifacts, but rather define the space within which the SEC continues to have a relative and distinct advantage as a regulator derived from the results that flow from independence. Four are discussed here: impartiality, avoiding short-term biases, expertise, and harnessing private parties.
Impartiality. The impartiality necessary to perform a quasi-judicial role in enforcement flows from independence. Like many other New Deal administrative agencies, the SEC sometimes performs a quasi-judicial function in ruling on whether a person's conduct has violated the provisions of the securities laws. Not only are there benefits to designing such a system in a nonpartisan way but there is a positive good in the political branches of the government not making the judicial-like decisions. This benefit of independence has been a staple of explanations about why we have independent agencies.
27
Avoiding Short-Termism. Independence can be a way to avoid the harms of short-term decision-making if decisions were to be left to the executive or legislative branches. The best example of this is how monetary policy is set, particularly over the last several decades. appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fourteen year terms and cannot be removed. While a president or legislators concerned about the next election could be expected to regularly err on the side of low interest rates even at the expense of creating runaway inflation, independent experts whose primary job is to set interest rates are more likely to find the appropriate balance.
Similar examples of using independence to avoid a harmful short-term bias can be found in securities and other areas. For example, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is an independent entity, so as to insulate the auditor oversight function from the seemingly inevitable pressure from the regulated industry on those who are making those decisions. Another example would be the BRAC approach to military base 30 closure.
31
Expertise. Independence can be a way to ensure or enhance the gains that would come from expertise as to the specialized and complex knowledge of markets and sophisticated financial transactions. This was a key explanation for the New Deal agencies in general, somewhat discounted in the last two 32 decades amidst concerns about accountability.
33
Harnessing the knowledge and expertise of the private sector. A lessrecognized benefit of independence is an agency's ability to access more effectively specialized knowledge and incentives of private firms in the regulated field. In a complex subject with many moving parts, an actor located within the industry possesses key knowledge needed for regulation, for example, detailed information of how an industry works, the incentives of those in the field, and where the abuses are likely to occur. Sometimes, important information is often only available as a byproduct of some other process, perhaps outside the regulatory reach but which would be known to one in the field.
It is not just specialized knowledge, however, that makes a regulatory agency's interface with the private participants potentially valuable. 35. There could also be cross-subsidization from a regulatory system that relies on a heavier does of self-regulation as occurred prior to the mid-1990s when the existing pattern of higher bid-ask spreads for the Nasdaq market seems to have permitted more analysts information available about stock. that information could be obtained by a detailed study of the field or by populating the regulatory agency with those with prior experience within the industry. A regulatory process that relies on self-regulation seeks to benefit as well from a greater willingness of private parties to participate in a regulatory system with some distance from the executive. This contributes a sense of ownership in the process for the private parties that is greater than would exist if the regulation came entirely from the government. Those within the industry have incentives to police their own, providing more effective regulation. When all in the industry can benefit by collective action, for example, to assure investors they will not be unfairly treated in markets, the actions of private participants may be more effective. They may understand the workings of the business in a way that those outside the industry do not. They may be able to insure compliance in ways that government regulators cannot. In working with a self-regulatory organization, an independent agency with a specific, defined focus may be better able to build a sense of professionalism than in a large government department. This may permit putting together a more competitive compensation package for employee regulators than would be possible if part of the regular government hiring process. On the other 34 side of the cost/benefit equation, self-regulation may facilitate shifting more of the costs of regulation from the government to the industry that should benefit from the regulation. 35 This discussion of the benefits of incorporating private firms and incentives into regulation is not only a happy story. The greater role for private parties, and their greater willingness to participate in the process, also increases the possibility of industry capture of the regulators that has long worried commentators. Indeed, that reality has led to a shift over time in the 36 relative roles of industry and government in securities regulation in the direction of greater government control as discussed below. Any use of self- regulatory organizations necessarily requires a consideration of both the costs and benefits of such a system as compared to alternatives systems that rely exclusively or mostly on government, or exclusively or mostly on markets. But securities regulation may provide one of the most detailed examples of where an independent government agency has been used to harness a wide array of participants from the industry to be regulated. Consider the breadth 37 of private actors incorporated within the SEC's regulatory web:
• Stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ stock market, determine rules for conduct in the trading of stock in those markets and listing standards for companies that seek to be listed on those exchanges. Long-time mutual firms owned by their members, stock exchanges have in the last decade become for-profit corporations owned by investors. As self-regulatory • In the specific realm of municipal securities, Congress has provided for another board of experts, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, but again the actions of this body are subject to the approval of the SEC.
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The field of securities regulation has a very densely populated set of selfregulatory organizations and other private actors. The pattern recurs in other fields but not to the same degree. One prominent example is the regional Federal Reserve Banks which are part of the central banking system. As discussed earlier, the regional banks provide five of the twelve members of the Federal Open Market Committee. The Committee determines core monetary policy in terms of setting interest rates at which the Federal Reserve lends to member banks. Unlike the Federal Reserve governors who occupy seven 49 slots on the FOMC, these regional presidents are not appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Rather, they are chosen by the boards of their regional bank, and two-thirds of the board members of those regional banks are chosen by the member banks within that particular geographic district. The result is to provide a structure that brings private parties into a 50 policy-setting apparatus.
Although the American system for securities regulation provides a plethora of illustrations of regulation by harnessing private parties, it is worth noting that there has been a distinct shift in securities regulation in recent years, enhancing the government's role in the regulation process at the expense of the "self" part of self-regulation. For example, for decades after 51 the enactment of the New Deal securities laws, broker-dealer regulation was performed, as described above within the umbrella of two "mutual" organizations owned by participants in the field, the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers. Enforcement was done by those in the business as part of the overall business. In the 1990s, separate scandals as to pricing practices on the NASDAQ and the NYSE led the SEC to push for governance reforms in both of those organizations in an effort to provide public control and break the direct control to those being regulated. When FINRA was created in 2006 to succeed to the NYSE and 52 NASD regulatory functions, the formal tie to the industry was cut. The result 53 was to move this regulation closer to the government regulation end of an industry/government spectrum.
Regulation of accountants and auditors has travelled along a similar road in which industry control of a self-regulatory system has, over time, given way to a process more within the government's domain. For decades after the appearance of federal securities laws, there was a peer-review based system to review possible auditor misconduct. The system was revised several times 54 over the decades leading to a byzantine and ineffective system. In that space, Sarbanes-Oxley authorized the PCAOB, moving the auditor regulatory system from its peer-reviewed roots to one that relied more on a government function, albeit one housed in a nominally separate but SEC-controlled entity. 56 Financial reforms proposed in the aftermath of the 2008 meltdown suggest this trend likely will continue with other actors in the financial services field. Hedge funds may be required to register and face other regulation. Additional government control is likely for credit-rating 57 agencies. The convergence of broker-dealers and investment advisors has led 58 to calls for parallel fiduciary duty standards for both sets of participants.
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The examples given in this part to illustrate the SEC's relative advantage as an independent agency in developing expertise and harnessing the private sector in pursuit of the regulatory goal relate almost entirely to the agency's performing two of the core functions identified at the beginning of this part-market regulation and oversight of the intermediaries who deal with investors. They illustrate a traditional strength of the agency, making use of its independence, and one that likely should continue in a stand-alone independent agency going forward. Part IV discusses the portion of the SEC's current agenda that fits outside of this template and which will depend on a somewhat different argument as to its purpose.
IV. REGULATION OF PUBLIC COMPANIES
Regulatory reforms after the meltdown have also included a set of proposals that focus on corporate governance more generally and not just on the markets and the intermediaries/gatekeepers in those markets. For example, the SEC proposed new rules to authorize shareholders to name nominees for director to be included on the corporation's proxy. There has been a broad series of proposals to regulate executive compensation, some of which involve the SEC and others relating to other federal authorities. Shareholder "say on pay" (at least a precatory or advisory vote) was required for companies getting federal money and has been proposed for companies more generally. The 61 federal pay czar, empowered by explicit legislative direction as part of the federal relief to various industries under the TARP program, has sharply curtailed portions of the compensation and shifted the types of compensation for the twenty-five highest paid employees of the seven firms with federal ownership. The Federal Reserve announced broad compensation guidelines 62 for banks under its control that reflects discussions among the G-20 countries and the Financial Stability Board.
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These governance proposals raise a different set of concerns in terms of defining the SEC's role going forward. The focus is on internal corporate governance-the appropriate role of managers and shareholders within the firm. Regulation on these topics makes less use of three of the independence characteristics discussed above-of impartiality, avoiding short termism and harnessing the private sector-than do the actions discussed in the previous section. The fourth characteristic, expertise, is surely visible, given the SEC's detailed prior work on executive compensation and on the relative roles of shareholders vis-à-vis directors. But on these topics, the SEC does not have the only claim to governmental expertise. State law has a parallel claim to expertise as to regulating corporate governance. In Delaware, the state with the greatest share of incorporations, the legislature regularly updates its statutes following the recommendations of a standing committee of the Delaware state bar. More relevant to the question of expertise, the Delaware 64 judiciary, specifically the ten judges on the Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court, bring an expertise to questions of corporate governance across a docket that exposes them to more extensive and sophisticated corporate issues than the comparable experience and docket of the federal judiciary or
